Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections by Uppal, Yogesh
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does legislative turnover adversely affect
state expenditure policy? Evidence from
Indian state elections
Yogesh Uppal
Youngstown State University
2. June 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15657/
MPRA Paper No. 15657, posted 12. June 2009 03:32 UTC
Does legislative turnover adversely affect state
expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections
Yogesh Uppal∗
Department of Economics
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, OH 44555, USA
Email: yuppal@ysu.edu
June 2, 2009
Abstract
I examine the effect of legislative turnover on the size and composition of government
expenditures in Indian state elections during 1980-2000. The paper finds that exces-
sive turnover in Indian state elections results in an inefficient government expenditure
policy. First, the higher the turnover, the larger is the size of government. Second,
excessive turnover affects the allocative efficiency of the government expenditure by
skewing the composition of government spending towards pure consumption expen-
diture and away from more productive investment expenditure. The findings imply
that a lack of a proper commitment mechanism in political markets could be a source
of inefficiency in government policy.
∗I thank Amihai Glazer, Keith Finlay, and the seminar participants at Kent State University and North-East
Ohio workshop at Cleveland State University for their helpful comments. All errors are mine.
1 Introduction
The efficiency of political markets has been a much debated issue in the field of political
economy. One view, mainly by Stigler (1971, 1972, 1982), Becker (1976, 1983, 1985), Peltz-
man (1976), andWittman (1989), argues that competition in political markets, analogous to
competition in economic markets, is efficient. According to scholars in this line of research,
competition for political office among candidates along with competition among various
interest groups ensures that the chosen policy is the most efficient. However, an opposing
school of thought is that political markets are inherently inefficient and competition among
the players causes excessive rent-seeking activity (Tullock 1967, 1983, 1989; McCormick et
al. 1984). The existing literature, in the context of trade policy, also argues that competitive
rent-seeking results in an efficiency loss to the economy (Krueger 1974, Bhagwati 1982,
Grossman and Helpman 1994). Laband and Sophocleus (1992), for instance, estimate that
rent seeking in allocating transfers cost the US at least one-fourth of its GDP in 1985.
Thispaper contributes to thedebate over the efficiencyofpoliticalmarkets andexamines
how the degree of turnover in elected office, as an aspect of political competition, affects
government fiscal policy. More specifically, I investigate the effect of legislative turnover
in a panel of 15 Indian states, which cover about 90% of Indian population, on the level
and composition of government expenditure during 1980-2000. Indian states provide a
pertinent laboratory for a study of the sub-national government policy. It is geographically
largewith a record of regular elections over a period of time allowing the researcher towork
with a relatively large dataset. Also, India is the largest democracy in the world due to the
sheer size of its electorate. There are about about half a billion registered voters, of which,
on average, about two-thirds exercise their franchise. Moreover, much scholarly work
focuses on the cross-country datasets for studying the effects various political variables
on government policy (De Haan and Strum 1994, Alesina and Perotti 1996, Vokerink and
De Haan 1999, Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002). Indian states function under the same
electoral system electing candidates based on a first-past-the-post system, and have the
same political system based on a parliamentary form of government. This accounts for
the problems that may plague a cross-country study, which makes it difficult to control for
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possible heterogeneities in the electoral or political systems.
Much theoretical work also exists on why political markets may not work efficiently.
Informational asymmetries between the electorate (principal) and the elected (agents) are
one source of inefficiency. Nordhaus (1975) shows that an opportunistic incumbent, who
has an informational advantage over the voters, follows a suboptimal policy right before
elections to increase his or her chances of reelection, leading to ”political business cycles”.
Rogoff (1990) extends the political business cycle theory using a rational expectation frame-
work, and shows that an incumbent who is seeking a reelection has incentives to spend
too much and tax too little during election years than off-elections years. Poterba (1994)
also finds evidence of electoral cycles in the US gubernatorial elections as tax increases
and spending cuts are both significantly smaller in gubernatorial election years than at
other times. Coate andMorris (1995) also argue that informational asymmetries in political
markets result in inefficient government transfers. Besley and Burgess (2002) argue that
the resolution of informational disadvantage make the governments more accountable.
They find that state governments in India respond better to natural calamities where the
newspaper circulation, which mitigates the informational disadvantage of voters, is high.
The literature also identifies lack of credible commitments leading to inability of the
current governments to contract with future government as another source of inefficiencies
in political markets (Alesina 1988). Alesina and Tabellini (1990) show that, in the absence
of credible commitments, government debt is strategically used by the current government
to influence the policies of a successor whose policy preferences are different. The current
government accumulates more debt than is optimal passing the burden of paying off the
debt to the future government. This tendency to accumulate debt is greater, the less is
the likelihood of reelection of the current government or greater is incumbent turnover.
Persson and Svensson (1989) also argue that a conservative government may accumulate
more debt if it expects to be replaced by a liberal government compared to the case when it
expects to stay in power. Polo (1998) shows that in absence of full commitments, an increase
in political competition could increase political rents. Crain and Tollison (1993) find that the
volatility of fiscal policy is higher in states that have greater legislative turnover. Leblanc
et al. (2000) show that when investment and spending decisions are made by majority-
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rule, even fully informed, non-myopic citizens will typically choose an inefficiently small
level of public investment and high level of public consumption due to lack of credible
commitments.1 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that current incumbent may not
undertake investment due to a threat of losing political power to a competing group so as
to reduce the size of the pie for the competitor and discourage any potential competitors. It
is plausible that this tendency towards not undertaking public investment will be greater,
the greater is the turnover. Bardhan and Yang (2004) suggest that incumbent turnover as
an aspect of competition in political markets could backfire if it becomes too high, forcing
incumbents to extract maximum rents today, affecting both efficiency of and accountability
in political markets.
The results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the higher the legislative
turnover, thehigher is the size of the government. Theofficeholders becomemoreprofligate
when they are less likely to retain their office in the next election. The current officeholder
rationally uses government spending as an instrument to constrain the future policies of
a rival as the latter will have more debt to pay off as a result of the current incumbent’s
profligacy. Second, I find thatmuchof the increase ingovernment spending is unproductive
in nature. More specifically, the higher the turnover, the higher is the revenue expenditure
(see below for definition) and the lower is the expenditure on the capital outlays. A shorter
time horizon due to high turnover skews an incumbent’s incentives towards unproductive
revenue expenditures and away from more productive capital outlays. This is rational
because the current incumbent enjoys the benefits of the short term spending in the present
(may be in terms of higher probability of reelection), but the costs may be be borne by the
future governments in terms of paying off a higher level of public debt. However, in case
of the capital outlays, the future government benefits from the returns on the investment.
The results of the paper have serious implications for economic growth. Grier and
Tullock (1987) show inapooled cross-sectionof 113 countries that thegrowthof government
consumption is significantly negatively correlated with the economic growth. Barro (1990,
1Glazer (1989) shows that lack of commitments between different generations of voters is responsible for a
bias of current voters towards durable projects rather thanmore efficient smaller projects. However, he focuses
on the choice among different size of investment projects rather than choice between public consumption and
investment.
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1991) shows that the greater the share of public consumption, theunproductive government
expenditure, inGDP compared to public investment, the productive expenditure, the lower
is the economic growth. It is likely that increasing public consumption not only crowds
out public investment, but also crowds out private investment bringing the rate of growth
of an economy down.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I discuss the fiscal position of
Indian states in section 2. In section 3, I lay out the empirical model, and describes the data.
I present the results of the paper in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper, and provides
a discussion of the results.
2 Fiscal position of Indian states and legislative turnover
India has a federal form of government with significant autonomy to the states. The
Indian Constitution lists the following functions for the central or federal government
under the heading of the Union list: defense, foreign relations, macroeconomic issues
including money supply, international trade and so on, and any inter-state issues. The
major subjects assigned to the states under the State list comprise public order, public
health, agriculture, irrigation, land rights, fisheries and industries and minor minerals.
There is also the Concurrent list, which describes the powers and functions under the joint
jurisdiction of federal and state governments. The States also assume a significant role for
subjects in the Concurrent list such as education and transportation, social security and
social insurance. On the revenue side, broad-based taxes, which include taxes on income
and wealth from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on production (excluding
those on alcoholic liquors) and customs duty, come under the federal jurisdiction. The
major taxes assigned to the state list include taxes on the sale and purchase of goods, taxes
on agricultural income and land, property taxes, and motor vehicle taxes.2
Lahiri (2000) argues that states’ own tax revenues have not grown much, mainly due
2Also, under the Constitution, the federal government shares the proceeds of certain centrally levied taxes
with the states, and makes grants to the states from the Consolidated Fund of India. The shares of the center
and the states and their allocation among different states are determined by the Finance Commission appointed
by the President of India every five years (or earlier if needed). In addition to tax devolution, the Finance
Commission is also required to recommend grants to the states in need of assistance.
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to their unwillingness to tax agriculture income and wide spread tax evasion. The sales
tax is the biggest component of state tax revenues amounting to about two-thirds of their
total tax revenues. However, the state expenditures have grown at a much rapid pace.
The panel (a) in Figure 1 plots average state government expenditure and revenues per
year as percentage of state GDPs. The state government expenditures have long diverged
from the revenues, which include states’ own tax revenue, non-tax revenue and revenues
from devolution of central taxes. As a result, Indian states have come under increasing
fiscal stress as their fiscal deficits have ballooned over the years. The fiscal deficit as a
percentage of state GDP for all states taken together increased from about 3% in 1980 to
5.5% in 2000.3 Lahiri (2000) also argues that growing fiscal deficits at the state level have
further constrained the ability of the central government, which also runs large deficit, to
enact economic reforms, and have threatened the macroeconomic stability of the Indian
economy.
Rao (2002) notes that much of the growth of state government expenditure is due to
increasing revenue (or current) expenditure, which is the expenditure on daily running
of the government not leading to the creation of assets, and hence, represents public
consumption. Revenue expenditure is comprised most notably of salaries of government
employees and military staff, perks for ministers, office furniture, grants to local bodies,
subsidies, interest on loans taken, and pensions. Rao argues that the growth in the revenue
expenditure has crowded out the capital expenditure. Capital expenditure is the other
category of total expenditure and mainly refers to the money spent on creating physical
assets such as roads, highways, and dams, buying land or building, purchasing machinery
and equipment, and hence, reflects public investment. The panel (b) in Figure 1 plots
the average revenue expenditure and capital expenditure as proportion of state GDP. The
average revenue expenditure for all the states taken together has increased from about
8% of state GDP in 1980 to about 13% in 2000, while the average capital expenditure has
declined from 5% of state GDP in 1980 to about 3% in 2000. Moreover, as Rao (2002)
3The central government imposes borrowing restrictions on the states giving the impression that the latter
have a hard budget constraint. However, Lahiri (2000) notes that the budget constraint appears hard only on
the surface. There are avenues that can soften the budget constraint, such as resources raised from the small
savings schemes under the public accounts, ways and means advance and overdraft from the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI), and resources raised from the state public sector enterprises.
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argues, much of the increase in the revenue expenditure is attributable to growth of non-
development expenditures, such as wages and salaries, subsidies, and interest payments
on government debt, rather than the development expenditure, which is expenditure on
proper running of economic and social services. Ravallion and Datt (2002) find that the
development expenditure is a significant determinant of poverty in India. The panel (c) in
Figure 1 plots the development expenditure as a proportion of revenue expenditure. The
development expenditure has declined over the years implying further deterioration in the
quality of government expenditure.
The level of legislative turnover has also increased over the years in Indian elections.
Uppal (2009) finds that incumbents are significantly less likely to win compared to chal-
lengers, and this incumbency disadvantage has increased after the 1990s. Figure 2 plots the
average turnover for each state. A legislature has, on average, about 69% new members.
This is in stark contrast to what we observe in the United States, where incumbent turnover
is only about 8-10% (Lee 2008; Uppal, forthcoming). Also, there is considerable variation
in the degree of incumbent turnover across states. It is the highest in Harayana (0.82) and
lowest in West Bengal (0.42). Figure 3 plots the average turnover per year. The turnover
schedule has shifted up over the years (for reasons I argue below). Lahiri (2000) argues
competitive politics in India has damaged any chances of fiscal prudence by the states for
the want of securing their vote bank. They have enacted various populist policies, such as
supply of free electricity to farmers, inadequate water charges, increase in government em-
ployment, and across the board pay increases, which have led to a growing deficit, mainly
on the revenue account, and crowding out of the more productive capital expenditure.
This paper exploits the variation, both across states and over time, in legislative turnover
in India to formally examine if high turnover adversely affects government spending in
Indian states resulting in much inefficiencies in political decision making.
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3 Model specification and data
3.1 The empirical model
The paper estimates the following empirical model:
GOVTEXPit = αi + γt + β × TURNOVERit + δ × Xit + µit (1)
where GOVTEXPit is the natural log of per capita real government expenditure -total,
revenue, and capital- in state i in year t. The total government expenditure per capita is a
measure of the size of government. I also use the proportion of total expenditure in state
income as an alternative measure of the size of government. As argued above, the revenue
expenditure is ameasure of public consumption as it is expenditure ondailymaintenance of
the organs of state, and the capital expenditure is ameasure of public investment. The state
fixed effects, αi, control for any state-specific, time-invariant factors. These time-invariant
factorsmay control for factors, such as ethnic heterogeneity among the Indian states, which
stays fairly constant over time, especially for a relatively shorter time period considered
in this paper. The time fixed effects, γt, account for any secular changes common across
states. Legislative turnover, TURNOVERit, is the proportion of new legislators in state i
in election year t. This measure of turnover reflects the simple probability that a legislator
will not be reelected in the next election. As such, the higher is this probability, the higher
is the legislative turnover. This measure of turnover does not distinguish between the
turnover in ruling party and the parties sitting in the opposition, and hence, takes into
account how turnover affects the pressure the minority party may put on the government
policy. However, I also check for the robustness of my results by accounting for turnover
only in the ruling party, which is mainly responsible for the government decision making.
Since turnover is observed only for election years, it is assumed constant in between two
elections.
The Xit is a vector of control variables, such as economic, political, demographic, and
natural factors that may affect government expenditures. The economic factors I control
for are: TAXREVENUEit, which is the natural log of state tax revenue; GRANTSit, which
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is the natural log of the federal grants to each state; and INCOMEit, which is the natural
log of state income per capita. The demographic controls are POPULATIONit, which is the
natural log of state population, andURBANit, which is the proportion of urban population
in each state. The government expenditure and its composition may be affected by natural
factors, such as a calamity. The most frequent calamities in India are floods and drought
due to excessive or deficient rainfall. Following Besley and Burgess (2002), I include an
indicator variable, CALAMITYit, which takes a value of 1 if the rainfall is two standard
deviations above (flood) or below (drought) the average rainfall and 0 otherwise. I also
control for political factors, such as TURNOUTit, which is the rate of voter turnout, and
ELECTIONYEARit, which takes a value of 1 for an election year and 0 otherwise. The latter
controls for any electoral fiscal policy cycles as the governments may attempt to be more
competent around election times.
As Alesina and Tabellini (1990) argue, in the absence of a credible commitment mech-
anism, an incumbent has incentives to implement a suboptimal fiscal policy if he or she is
less likely to get reelected. In the context of this paper, this implies that a higher rate of
legislative turnover should increase the size of government. Since the current incumbent
has greater likelihood of losing power, he or she may incur sub-optimally higher amount
of spending. This is perfectly rational behavior by the current incumbent as the burden of
paying for the large government will fall on the future incumbent, who may have to either
raise the taxes or cut the spending. This testable relationship is specified in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 The higher the turnover, the higher is the government expenditure.
Also, a higher rate of legislative turnover could reduce an incumbent’s expected tenure
in the office, shortening his or her time-horizon. As a result, a higher rate of turnover is
expected to increase public consumption expenditure at the expense of public investment
expenditure. An incumbent, faced with a lower likelihood of reelection, has an incentive
to spend on avenues that have immediate results when he or she is still in the office rather
than to spend on investment projects that take longer to yield returns and likely benefit the
future incumbent. The implied relationship between turnover and the composition of the
total expenditure is given in Hypothesis 2.
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Hypothesis 2 The higher the turnover, the higher is the revenue expenditure and the lower is the
capital expenditure.
The second hypothesis implies that much of the increase in total expenditure as a result of
turnover is due to rising revenue expenditure. Turnover affects the allocative efficiency of
government expenditure by encouraging unproductive public consumption expenditure,
which crowds out the productive public investment expenditure.
3.2 Data
The paper examines the effect of legislative turnover on government expenditures in a
panel of 15 Indian states during 1980-2000. The source of the election data is the Statistical
Reports on General Election to Legislative Assembly of States published by the Election
Commission of India (ECI).4 The dataset provides information on candidates’ names, vote
shares, party affiliation, and the rate of voter turnout.
The data on levels and composition of state government expenditures is taken from the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Indian central bank. This data is the most comprehensive
data on state finances in India and provides information on various components of state
government expenditure - total, revenue and capital. The dataset also provides information
on the sources of revenue of the state governments, such as own tax revenue, grants
from the federal governments, and so on. All the expenditure and revenue variables are
deflated using the average of consumer price index (CPI) for industrial and agricultural
workers. The data on state income, total population, and proportion of urban population
are taken from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India. The state income is the
net state domestic product in 1980 prices. The data on total population and proportion
of urban population are available from the decennial census of India in 1981, 1991 and
2001. The values were interpolated for the non-census years. The state-wise rainfall data
are available from the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology (IITM) website.5 Figure 4
plots the average total, revenue and capital expenditures per capita for each state. There
4The source of the data is ECI’s website at www.eci.gov.in. The data are in Acrobat Reader format and were
converted in a format suitable for empirical analysis using an elaborately written software program.
5URL: http://www.tropmet.res.in/ accessed in December, 2007.
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is considerable variation in the per capita expenditures across states. Whereas Punjab and
Haryana spend more per capita than other states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh spend very
little. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables with standard errors in the
parentheses.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Main results
Table 2 examines how legislative turnover affects total government expenditure and alters
an incumbent’s incentives towards division of expenditure into revenue and capital types.
All regressions include state and timefixed effects to control for state specific, time-invariant
factors and secular changes constant across states, respectively, and use robust standard
errors,which are given in theparentheses. Column (1) regresses logof total real expenditure
per capita on turnover using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Turnover has a
positive effect on the size of the government, and the effect is statistically significant at 1%
level of significance. A one percentage point increase in turnover increases the total real
per capita expenditure by about 0.25 percent. The sign and significance of the effect of
turnover implies that a lower chance of reelection makes the current incumbent profligate.
It is perfectly rational for the current incumbent to do so, as it passes the burden of paying
for his or her profligacy to the future incumbent, who may have to raise taxes or cut
spending to pay for the big government inherited from his or her predecessor. As Dixit et
al. (2000) argue, both the current and future incumbent would be better-off by coordinating
on a compromise policy. However, due to a lack of proper commitment mechanism, it is
rational for all incumbents to pursue a suboptimal spending policy. In column (2), I include
various economic, political, demographic, and natural factors that may affect the total
government expenditure. The effect of turnover, though slightly smaller in magnitude,
remains positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The effects of various control
factors in column (2) are as expected. The states that have more tax revenues or receive
more grant money from the federal government have higher spending. The richer a state,
the more it spends. The effects of these economic factors are highly significant. Also, more
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populous states have lower spending per capita, and the effect is significant at 10% percent
level. The election year spending is lower, as supported by the electoral fiscal cycle theory,
but is highly insignificant. The effects of proportion of urban population, turnout and
calamity are also highly insignificant.
In column (3), log of revenue expenditure per capita is regressed on turnover. The
effect of turnover is positive and highly significant. A one percentage point increase in
turnover increases revenue expenditure by about 0.34 percent. The effect is similar in
column (4) where I include various control variables in the model. In column (5), I regress
log of capital outlays per capita on turnover. In contrast to a positive effect on revenue
expenditure, the effect of turnover on capital outlays is negative. However, the effect is
insignificant at the conventional levels of statistical significance. The effect stays negative,
albeit highly insignificant, when I include other explanatory variables. However, a look at
the proportion of revenue expenditure in total expenditure provides a stronger evidence
of an adverse effect of turnover on the composition of total expenditure. In column (7),
the proportion of revenue expenditure in total expenditure increases significantly with
turnover. A one percentage point increase in turnover increases the proportion of revenue
expenditure by about 0.07 percentage points. The effect of turnover on proportion of
revenue expenditure is also positive and significant in column (8) when I include other
explanatory variables. Although tax revenue significantly affects the level of expenditure,
it does not have a significant effect on its composition. Federal grants finance capital outlays
more than revenue expenditure, decreasing the proportion of revenue expenditure. The
proportion of revenue expenditure is lower in richer states. Also, greater turnout and
incidence of a calamity decrease the proportion of revenue expenditure significantly.
The above findings suggest an adverse effect of legislative turnover on the allocative
efficiency of public expenditure. An incumbent with lower likelihood of reelection has an
incentive to target spending towards avenues that show results in the immediate future
when he or she is still in the office and could possibly raise his or her chances of reelection.
With high turnover, there is a greater probability that the cost of these increased spending
are borne by the future incumbent, thus constraining the latter’s policy set. However, the
money spent on public investment projects will only reap benefits later when the future
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incumbent will be in the power. This further underscores the importance of commitment
problems evident in the behavior of politicians causing much inefficiencies in political
markets.
Table 3 uses alternative measures of expenditures to confirm the effect of turnover on
the government policy. The dependent variables are the expenditures - total, revenue, and
capital - expressed as proportions of state income rather than the levels of expenditures.
In column (1), I regress the proportion of total expenditure in state income on turnover. A
one percentage point increase in turnover results in about 0.02 percentage point increase
in the total expenditure as a proportion of state income. The effect is significant at 10%
level of significance. The effect is more pronounced in column (2) where I include various
control variables. The findings related to the composition of expenditure are much similar
to what we found above in Table 2. Legislative turnover affects the revenue expenditure as
a proportion of state income positively and significantly. In column (3), a one percentage
point increase in turnover increases the revenue expenditure as a proportion of income
by about 0.023 percentage points. The effect is also positive and significant in column (4)
after including other variables. However, the effect of turnover on capital expenditure as a
proportion of state income, though still negative, is highly insignificant.
In column (7), the dependent variable is the development expenditure as a proportion
of revenue expenditure. As noted earlier, the revenue expenditure has two components -
the development and non-development expenditures, and the development expenditure
is a significant determinant of poverty in India. A higher level of turnover negatively
affects this component of revenue expenditure. One percentage point increase in turnover
results in a decrease of about 0.12 percentage points in development expenditure as a
proportion of revenue expenditure. The effect is significant at 1% level of significance. The
effect is similar in column (8) where I include various control variables. This underscores
the adverse effect of turnover on government expenditure policy, and suggests that much
of the increase in the total expenditure in Indian states is due to an increasing revenue
expenditure, which, in turn, has increased owing to rising non-development expenditure
at the expense of the development expenditure. Other than turnover, economic factors,
such as tax revenue, grants, and state income, have a positive and significant effect on
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the proportion of development expenditure. The proportion of urban population has a
negative and significant effect on development spending. This would be the case, for
instance, if more development monies are spent on rural projects than urban projects
to alleviate poverty. Also, a higher level of turnout increases development expenditure
significantly. This effect might be explained by, generally, an overwhelming turnout of
poor and lower strata of population in India (Yadav 2000). Also, an incidence of calamity
results in greater development spending as a proportion of revenue expenditure.
5 Robustness checks
Table 4 performs a few robustness checks on the effect of turnover on the level of govern-
ment expenditures. In column (1), I include the lagged values of log of the total expenditure
per capita. The lagged value of total expenditure has a significantly positive effect on the
total expenditure. However, the effect of turnover remains positive and significant. The
effect if similar in column (2) after inclusion of other explanatory variables. In columns (3)
and (4), I include the lagged values of log of revenue expenditure per capita as an additional
regressor. The effect of turnover on the revenue expenditure is positive and significant in
column (3), and in column (4) where I also include all the other variables. As above, the ef-
fect of turnover on the capital outlays is negative, but insignificant. In column (7), the effect
of turnover on the revenue expenditure as a proportion of the total expenditure is positive
and significant at 10% level when lagged values of the dependent variable are included. In
column (8) when I include all other variables in addition to lagged values of proportion of
revenue expenditure, the effect of turnover is positive, but no longer significant. However,
it is similar in magnitude to the effect in the previous column.
Table 5 checks the robustness of the effect of turnover using an alternative measure
of turnover. The turnover variable in Table 5 measures the proportion of seats that the
incumbent party loses in the next election. In column (1), the effect of turnover on the
size of government is still positive. A one percentage point increase in turnover in the
ruling party increases the total government expenditure per capita by about 0.1 percent
and, the effect is significant at 1% level of significance. In column (2), I include all the
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other control variables. The effect of turnover on the size of government is still positive
and significant. In column (3), the effect of turnover on the revenue expenditure in the
ruling party is positive and significant. The effect stays positive and significant in column
(4) where I include all the other variables. In columns (5) and (6), the effect of turnover on
capital outlays, as found above, is insignificant. As found above, the effect of turnover on
the proportion of revenue expenditure is positive in in columns (7) and (8). The effect is
significant at 10% level when I include the other control variables.
As discussed above, the OLSmethod could be problematic if turnover is endogenously
determined. Although I do not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of turnover using
the Hausman test, I still present results from the IV method using an indicator variable for
the anti-defection (AD) law as an instrument for legislative turnover.6 The anti-defection
law was passed in March, 1985 as the 52nd amendment to the Indian constitution and
banneddefections, thatwere commonplace in the preceding period, of individualmembers
from their political parties.7 The law, although did make individual defections illegal,
encouraged en bloc defections due to a few major loopholes. For instance, if at least
one-thirds of the members of a party decide to split and form a new party, called a split,
the defected members are not disqualified. As a result, the AD law of 1985, by banning
individual defections, left a split of parent parties as the only option for sincere members,
who had ideological differenceswith the party, or for any opportunistmembers. According
to Spieb and Pehl (2003), there were more defections after the law was enacted than
before the law. The bulk defections gave new impetus to the process of fragmentation of
Indian party system, which had started in the mid-1960s at the state level due to declining
dominance of the Congress party. Shridharan (2002, pp 495-96) argues that although at
the aggregate national level Indian political system became more fragmented, the party
systemat the state level followedDuvergeriandynamicsdue to aggregationof votes around
a leading party and its principal rival.8 He further argues that this led to a consolidation
6The results of the Hausman test are available from the author upon request.
7These defections were questioned on many grounds because not only they altered the electoral mandate,
but also encouraged opportunistic behavior by the elected members to trade support for or against the
government (Kamath 1985). The rationale behind the law is that if a candidate decides to defect to another
party, he or she should be suspended from the membership of the elected body, and seek a fresh mandate from
the voters as a member of his or her new party.
8Maurice Duverger put forward a proposition, later came to be known as Duverger’s law, that the first-
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of party system at the state level over time. As could be seen in Figure 3, there is also a
trend towards declining turnover at the state level over the same period except right after
the AD law is passed. There is a distinct jump in legislative turnover after 1985. It is
highly plausible that the consolidation of Indian party systemwas halted due to incentives
towards bulk defections and smaller parties that increased legislative turnover.
Table 6 summarizes the results using the IV method. The results using the IV method
are similar to the results of the OLS method above. In column (1), the effect of turnover on
the level of government expenditure is positive and highly significant. A one percentage
point increase in turnover increases the government expenditure by about 0.68 percent.
In column (2) which includes other explanatory variables, the effect remains positive and
significant at 10% level. In columns (3)-(6), turnover affects the revenue expenditure
positively and the capital expenditure negatively. Much similar to the results above, the
effect on the revenue expenditure is significant, while the effect on the capital outlays is
insignificant. In columns (7)-(8), turnover positively affects the revenue expenditure as a
proportion of total expenditure.
6 Conclusions and discussion
I examine the effect of legislative turnover on government expenditures in Indian state
elections. I find that turnover increases the level of public expenditure per capita. A high
rate of turnover changes a legislator’s calculation of his or her expected tenure, and hence,
alters his or her incentives while in the office. A higher level of turnover may result in
increased government spending because a legislator, who is less likely to get reelected,
would want to constrain the policies of his or her successor, who may have to either rein
in spending or increase taxes to pay for the big government inherited from the current
incumbent.
I also find that the higher the turnover, the higher is the revenue expenditure per capita,
and the lower is the capital expenditure per capita. Further, a high level of turnover de-
creases the proportion of development expenditure. So, a higher level of turnover not
past-the-post electoral systems tend towards a two party system due to the tendency over time for third and
more parties to become uncompetitive and get eliminated.
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only increases the level of expenditure, but also alters the composition of expenditure.
More specifically, the reelection concerns arising due to a higher level of turnover shorten
current incumbent’s horizon. He seeks to signal his or her competency by spending on
programs that show results immediately when he is still in the office rather than undertak-
ing any public investment that will longer to show results and will likely benefit the future
incumbent.
The results of this paper have important implications. First, the paper finds that
turnover raises public consumption, which crowds out public investment. Increasing pub-
lic consumption may affect growth by affecting public investment, as argued by Barro
(1990) or by crowding out private investment, as argued by Alesina and Perrotti (1996).
Second, decreasing share of development expenditure may seriously constrain the func-
tioning of various necessary government programs, such as education and health, a higher
level of turnover adversely impacts these activities, which are a main recourse for the poor
and disadvantaged in the developing countries, as argued by Ravallion and Datt (2002).
16
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Figure 1: Fiscal situation of Indian states
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Figure 2: Average turnover, by state
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Figure 3: Average legislative turnover, by year
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Figure 4: Average government expenditures, by state
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